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Abstract
This paper provides evidence that audit reports convey 
relevant evidence for inferring the existence of under-
lying, unrevealed, financial imbalances. Unlike previo-
us works, which studied US listed-firms bankruptcy, our 
research deals with Spanish non-financial SMEs under 
financial stress. Our results indicate that the audit of dis-
tressed SMEs has several distinctive features: higher au-
ditor rotation, more qualified reports, and non-complian-
ce with deadlines to approve and file the annual financial 
statements. We use this evidence to build and test a parsi-
monious and reliable forecast model. Several implicatio-
ns for auditors’ independence, information quality, and 
failure forecast are discussed.
Keywords: financial distress, failure forecast, audit qua-
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Un modelo simple para pronosticar las tensiones financieras, basado en evi-
dencias de auditoría
Resumen
Este artículo proporciona evidencia de que los informes de auditoría contienen 
evidencias relevantes para inferir la existencia de disfunciones financieras latentes. 
A diferencia de trabajos previos, que han estudiado el fallo financiero en grandes 
empresas cotizadas, fundamentalmente de EE.UU., nuestro trabajo se centra en 
Pymes españolas sometidas a tensiones financieras latentes. Nuestros resultados 
indican que la auditoría de las Pymes financieramente desequilibradas posee varias 
características distintivas: una tasa mayor de rotación de auditores, más informes 
con salvedades e incumplimientos de los plazos legales para aprobar y registrar las 
cuentas anuales. Empleamos estas evidencias para construir y verificar un modelo 
simple, o parsimonioso, capaz de anticipar eficazmente esas disfunciones. Se dis-
cuten las implicaciones para la independencia del auditor, la calidad de la informa-
ción, y el pronóstico del fallo.
Palabras clave: tensión financiera, pronóstico de fallo, calidad de la auditoría, re-
gresión logística.
Introduction
When a company disappears or becomes insolvent there are serious implications 
for many external and internal economic agents; obviously, shareholders but also 
moneylenders, clients and suppliers, employees and the authorities themselves. 
That’s why business failure has been a recurrent topic in literature, and the deve-
lopment of forecast methods has been one of the priority objectives for Financial 
Research.
There are several mathematical and heuristic methodologies suitable for this pur-
pose, e.g. multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) (Altman, 1968): logistic regres-
sion (logit) (Martin, 1977; Beaver, 1966; Ohlson, 1980): Bayesian analysis and 
several artificial intelligence (AI) applications. Most of them use financial ratios as 
independent variables, thus they rely on the quality of accounting information. A parsimonious model to forecast financial distress, based on audit evidence
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An exhaustive conceptual framework has been developed to enhance accounting 
information quality. The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) de-
fine common standards for the format and content of financial statements, for the 
valuation and specification of the assets, and generic principles to guarantee the 
quality of accounting information; they have been adopted by more than one hun-
dred countries around the world, including Spain. 
Notwithstanding these rules, the external audit is the main guarantee of the qua-
lity and reliability of financial information. Auditors are committed to issue an 
expert opinion about whether financial statements have been developed according 
to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP): and convey a fair expres-
sion of the financial and economic situation of the company. Distressed companies 
usually try to avoid disclosures by making abnormally high accruals (Herbohn 
and Ragunathan, 2008): but these adjustments are not easy to interpret (Arnedo et 
al., 2005): an increase of accounts receivable might be interpreted as a sign of the 
growth in sales but, also, might be caused by changes in sales policies aimed at, 
precisely, hiding declining sales. Of course, these accruals may lead to qualified 
reports (Francis and Krishnan, 1999); thus, distressed companies have an incenti-
ve to hire low quality auditors, and to undermine auditors’ independence in order 
to “manage” audit reports. Previous research has found evidence supporting that 
latent financial distress manifests itself, indirectly, in certain anomalous external 
events related to the auditing process such as systematic auditor changes, reluctan-
ce to hire auditors from the national firms or the big four firms, and correlations 
between auditor changes and issuing clean reports (Schwartz and Menon, 1985; 
Schwartz and Soo, 1995; Ruiz and Gómez, 2001)
This paper gives an in-depth examination of both the conduct of the auditor and the 
signals stemming from the audit of accounts, in the particular case of the non-fi-
nancial SMEs under financial distress. We will provide a parsimonious forecasting 
model, capable of assessing effectively the financial health of the company and to 
provide a reliable estimate of the likelihood of its financial failure. This model is 
a novel contribution as the previous research had been focused on the descriptive 
study of the audit features in financially instable companies, especially in Anglo-
Saxon countries. However, there has been no consideration on using those featu-
res to establish a complementary analysis to those performed by the conventional 
MDA or logit models, which are based on financial ratios; this is particularly true 
in the case of small companies. Our research provides a reliable forecast model 
that achieves a high hit rate and that depends on objective variables derivable Carlos Piñeiro Sánchez, Pablo de Llano Monelos y Manuel Rodríguez López
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from the audit reports; this model provides useful results to clarify the effects of 
information asymmetries and the balance of power between the auditor and his/her 
client with respect to the quality of the general accounting information and, par-
ticularly, of the audit report. In addition, it formalises the logical links between 
the content of the audit report, the quality of the accounting information and the 
internal financial imbalances.
A key contribution of our work is its approach, which is focused on the analysis of 
failure risks in SMEs, which are usually pushed into the background by the empha-
sis on the listed companies research. This is a very valuable contribution as SMEs 
make up the bulk of the Spanish business fabric. Also, information asymmetries 
and imperfections are much more evident in them. 
A large majority of the early research in this field comes from countries based on 
common-law accounting systems. Despite the standardisation brought forward by 
the IFRS, the accounting conceptual framework, the business culture and technical 
auditing rules are still somehow different in the continental countries, and especia-
lly Spain (Arnedo et al., 2005): for example, qualified reports are more frequent 
in Spain compared to the US, not because Spanish companies breach the accoun-
ting rules more often, but because most of the qualifications in the US correspond 
to exceptions to the going concern principle (Carcello and Palmrose, 1994). The 
evidence provided by our work allows us to reinterpret this early research in ac-
cordance with the particular features of the Spanish legal framework and provides 
a base for the comparative analysis of the Spanish SMEs against other types of 
companies.
Background
The core of business failure research is linked to the accounting tradition and ex-
plores the possibility of forecasting business failure events based on the financial 
information released by companies. The first contributions applied univariate sta-
tistical methods to search for statistically significant differences between healthy 
and bankrupt companies (Beaver, 1966). However, it was not long before the 
business failure was described as a complex process caused by –and manifested 
itself in– multiple variables. Since the release of Altman’s research papers (Alt-
man, 1968) the dominant methodological approach has been applying multivariate 
methods –especially, multiple discriminant analysis (MDA): and the logit or probit 
models (Ohlson, 1980)– on time-series samples of healthy and bankrupt compa-A parsimonious model to forecast financial distress, based on audit evidence
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nies. These models use financial ratios as independent variables, and in some cases 
also market information (e.g. profitability, risk, PER, price/book value, etc.) and 
macroeconomic indicators to express systematic risk factors (Rose et al., 1982; 
Mensah, 1984; Liu, 2004).
Recently, a promising breakthrough has been achieved with the application of heu-
ristic methods: some studies try to enhance a priori failure probabilities using a 
posteriori information applying Bayesian inference (e.g. Sarkar and Sriram, 2001); 
cooperative and team work have been also used to deal with multicriteria problems 
involving qualitative variables (Sun and Li, 2009). A relevant research program 
develops artificial intelligence –based on tools to improve failure forecasts–, e.g. 
support vector machines (SVM) (Kim and Sohn, 2010): expert systems and arti-
ficial neural networks (Messier and Hansen, 1988; Bell et al., 1990; Serrano and 
Martín del Brío, 1993; Rodríguez et al., 2010). 
Whatever the methodology, the inference process is based on the companies’ pub-
lic information, which is a variable combination of accounting information, market 
information, and qualitative measures about the quality of management (Peel et 
al., 1986; Keasey and Watson, 1987). External audit plays a critical role as the 
main guarantee of the quality of accounting data.
Auditors are committed to reduce the information asymmetries between manag-
ers, shareholders, and external users of accounting information, by ensuring that 
this information is reliable and revealing relevant GAAP non-observances. Pre-
vious works have found a correlation between discretionary accruals, auditor’s 
quality, financial distress, and qualified reports (Butler et al., 2004; Arnedo et al, 
2005; Blay, 2005): distressed companies have an obvious incentive to conceal 
data and references whose interpretation may be unfavourable, hiding them within 
the flow of information directed to investors, suppliers and other external groups 
(McKeown et al., 1991); in some cases they can simply obviate these references, 
but they frequently make use of accruals to smooth down the changes in critical 
financial magnitudes, e.g. sales, bad debts or costs (Arnedo et al., 2005). If au-
ditors do perform well, abnormal accruals, GAAP non fulfilments, and relevant 
uncertainties should be correlated with qualified reports, even with denials if the 
company hinders the work of the auditor (Citron and Tafler, 1992; Hopwood et al, 
1989; Herbohn and Ragunathan, 2008); thus, modified reports might be interpreted 
as external signs of latent financial imbalances (Bushman and Collins, 1998): and 
also convey information about audit quality.Carlos Piñeiro Sánchez, Pablo de Llano Monelos y Manuel Rodríguez López
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A part of the research has found little evidence of this relationship, and the hy-
pothesis that qualifications do not have specific information content has taken hold 
over the years (Elliot, 1982; Dodd et al., 1984; Bessell et al., 2003). The so-called 
neutrality hypothesis has been used as an argument to explain the apparent low ca-
pacity of the accounting audit to highlight issues affecting the going-concern (Alt-
man and McGough, 1974; Venuti, 2004). However, discarding the informational 
content of the qualifications is a very demanding assumption; it implies that the 
audit report does not provide relevant evidence to interpret the financial situation 
of the company, and figure out the capacity of the company to survive as an eco-
nomic unit, not even when the auditor highlights relevant breakdowns or reveals 
uncertainties. Several works have found that investors perceive audit reports as 
informative (Dopuch et al., 1986; Loudder et al., 1992).
In fact, an auditor is not engaged to act as a financial analyst and search for finan-
cial imbalances, but only to express a professional opinion about the fairness of 
financial statements. A clean report is compatible with severe financial imbalances 
as long as the auditor considers that GAAP has been rigorously applied, and the 
information conveyed by the annual accounts can be considered reliable. Actually, 
only a few critical uncertainties are directly connected to the company’s survival, 
and even in these cases, the company may be able to avoid failure by applying 
major corporate restructuring plans. In the Spanish case, art. 2.1 of the Law on 
Account Auditing –redrafted by Law 12/20111– has modified the criteria to reveal 
uncertainties by applying a restrictive interpretation of the auditor’s functions: up 
to this day, uncertainties had to be specifically recorded as qualifications. Howev-
er, the new Spanish auditing standards establish that, if the uncertainty is proper-
ly described in the Annual Report, the audit report will just include an emphasis 
paragraph. A qualification or, when appropriate, an adverse opinion will be issued 
only when the representativeness of the annual accounts is slackened because the 
uncertainty is insufficiently or imperfectly expressed.
1The spanish regulatory framework has gone through relevant changes to update and adapt to the international 
accounting regulations; in the case of audit, several changes came after incorporating the Directive 2006/43/CE 
into the national law. The Law 12/2011 of 30 June modifies many aspects of the old Law 19/1988. Among these 
aspects, we can mention the principles influencing the auditor's opinion when there are uncertainties that may 
affect the going concern principle.A parsimonious model to forecast financial distress, based on audit evidence
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Moreover, the nature and financial implications of the qualifications may be very 
different2; their evaluation also depends on several subjective factors, e.g. auditors’ 
knowledge, thoroughness and materiality levels applied (Francis and Krishnan, 
1999). In fact, discussing the forecasting relevance of qualifications and modified 
audit reports implies making judgments about audit quality, and auditor’s inde-
pendence.
Although they are supposed to act as independent experts, the company discretion-
ally hires auditors; this places them in a potentially tense position with their clients 
(Krishnan and Krishnan, 1996; Blay, 2005). Economic or interest relationships –
such as having common clients– might undermine the auditor’s independence, and 
even distort the report (Simunic, 1984; Robinson, 2008). 
Among the incompatibility cases, the Law 12-2010 includes providing legal ser-
vices –also the development of Information Technology platforms and, we must 
understand, any type of consultancy service in general– to the company subject to 
auditing (or its affiliates) except when the services are provided by a different legal 
entity managed by a different board of directors, and/or when those services are 
related to issues with very little impact on the annual accounts subject to analysis. 
The receipt of professional fees is also forbidden except when they are of relative-
ly minor importance compared to the total income of the auditor. However, even 
the smallest corporation groups are made up of numerous entities, managed by 
different boards but connected by the same capital links; accounting and auditing 
firms are not an exception. It is also well known that the auditor’s fees must be es-
tablished before starting the activity and cannot depend on, or be influenced by, the 
fact that other services are being hired. This is strictly prohibited; however it’s no 
wonder that this issue is subliminally present in the contract negotiations between 
the company and the auditor, as well as in the creation of the corresponding letter 
of engagement.
Some evidence indicates that informational asymmetries and the strategic ap-
proach play an important role in the assessment of the material evidence and the 
2Also as the audit report is released together with and inseparably from the annual financial statements, it is 
difficult to evaluate to which extent the market reaction is caused either by the content of the report or by a 
diagnosis based on the primary accounting information itself or by a combination of both (Elliot, 1982) (Dodd, 
Dopuch, Holthausen, & Leftwich, 1984).Carlos Piñeiro Sánchez, Pablo de Llano Monelos y Manuel Rodríguez López
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opinion-making process (Citron and Taffler, 1992; Krishnan and Krishnan, 1996; 
Tucker and Matsumura, 1998; Chen et al., 2009). The opinion-making process is 
determined by the effect the auditor expects his report will have on the way the 
company interacts with its surroundings, particularly the effect on the quotes of 
publicly traded companies. Once again, because of the informational asymmetries, 
auditors might be reluctant to release opinions that may reveal latent financial dys-
functions and precipitate the failure; for example, by instilling suspicion into the 
moneylenders or by altering the materials supply or by increasing the interest rates 
applied in several refinancing operations. Kida (1980) suggested that even when 
it is widely assumed that the company will fall into an imminent business failure, 
auditors may decide not to issue an opinion with critical uncertainties with respect 
to the continuity of the company. This is the basis of the hypothesis of self-fulfilling 
prophecy: under some circumstances, auditors might avoid disclosures in fear that 
their opinion can precipitate the failure. Some researchers claim that the auditors 
may have the tendency to interpret evidence optimistically, that is, to give more 
weight to the evidence supporting the survival of the company.
The bundle of informational interchanges between the auditor, his client and the 
market is extremely complex, to the point that the imbalances and the lack of con-
fidence may be transmitted to the auditor’s client and end up altering his market 
prices and volatility (Hillinson and Pacini, 2004). Game theory has been applied 
to describe the interactive nature of this relation, and the underlying information 
asymmetries  (Fellingham  and  Newman,  1985; Teoh,  1992;  Matsumura  et al., 
1997; Tucker and Matsumura, 1998).
This research program has supplied a deep knowledge about auditors’ behaviour 
in disrupted companies. Companies that change their auditor several times ob-
tain qualified audit reports less frequently (Lennox, 2000) whilst it has been ob-
served that distressed companies change their auditor more frequently than av-
erage (Schwartz and Menon, 1985; Schwartz and Soo, 1995; Ruiz and Gómez, 
2001). Likewise, auditors tend to issue clean reports when there are reasons to be 
concerned about whether the client will not renew the contract or will cancel it 
prematurely (Blay, 2005).
In fact, imbalanced firms have incentives to select vulnerable auditors, and to apply 
rotation strategies in order to gain a dominant position over the auditor, and “plan” 
the reports (Francis and Krishnan, 1999; Chen et al., 2009); this action is often A parsimonious model to forecast financial distress, based on audit evidence
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related to an attempt to hold back the release of modified opinion reports, and/or 
going-concern disclosures. From this point of view, the trend to make short-term 
arrangements could be interpreted as an attempt to disable the effectiveness of the 
legal limitations with respect to the minimum duration of the audit contracts3.
Several countries have implemented mandatory changes in order to avoid the de-
velopment of economic dependencies and/or an excessive closeness to the client, 
which might undermine auditor’s independence4; this can create conflicts of inter-
est, in the same way that the ratings issued by rating agencies may be biased by the 
economic interests of its owners, who are also profit-guided investors. However, 
evidence on the so-called opinion purchase is inconclusive and requires a more 
specific study to clarify the extent of the auditor’s vulnerability with respect to his 
economic dependence, the size and diversification of his client portfolio and his 
degree of internationalisation. A low rotation might be interpreted also as a sign of 
lack of independence (Beck et al., 1988): but evidence in this area is inconclusive 
(e.g. Carcello et al., 2003)
Methodology
Dependent variable
Bankruptcy is usually the word we use to describe the situation in which the com-
pany is unable to make its payments. This definition is too broad for our purposes 
because financial distress situations do not necessarily lead to insolvency, or the 
demise of the company; on the other hand, covenants to extend the payment terms 
may not be revealed to the environment, and this prevents any exhaustive classi-
fication. In this work we define distressed companies as those who have filed for 
bankruptcy protection, but have not been liquidated; this allows for a rigorous and 
exhaustive classification in two categories: healthy (0) and distressed companies 
(1). Then, our model helps forecast the likelihood that a company suffers financial 
tensions that prevents timely payments due to liquidity problems, even if this si-
tuation does not cause an irreversible bankruptcy.
3Contracts in Spain must last for a minimum of three years (art. 8 quarter of the Law 12/2010); during that time, 
the contract cannot be cancelled without good cause.
4Mandatory rotation does not exist in Spain.Carlos Piñeiro Sánchez, Pablo de Llano Monelos y Manuel Rodríguez López
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This specification is also coherent with the usual practice of filing for filed for 
bankruptcy protection (nowadays, defined as voluntary bankruptcy proceedings 
for creditors in Spanish law) to avoid criminal responsibility in imminent bankrup-
tcy situations (Pozuelo et al., 2010); if this line of reasoning is correct, the majority 
of the companies under financial stress will urge bankruptcy proceedings, thus 
improving the reliability of our model. 
Independent variables
Assessing the information content of the audit reports and the ability of auditors 
to convey relevant signals to forecast business failure is extremely controversial. 
Inductive reasoning is required to deduce whether the qualified opinions and/or 
the uncertainties proposed in each case by the auditor are helpful to assess the 
risks. This significance is only known in a reliable way ex post. Therefore, despite 
having made considerable advances in the codification of qualifications regarding 
their potential financial impact, in this study we use a simplified set of explanatory 
variables inspired by three principles: objectivity, simplicity, and direct derivabi-
lity from the audit reports. All of the variables are supported by previous research, 
although cited works were performed on samples of large, publicly quoted, firms. 
	Proportion of audited years (pyears). This variable allows us to control the 
company’s size, which is a documented factor of financial risk5 – and enhance 
the expression of certain anomalous behaviour, as the non-compliance with 
the auditing obligation. This variable is not interpreted as a predictive factor, 
bus as a control factor.
	Number of different auditors hired (naudit). Previous research indicates that 
increased rotation is more frequent in distressed firms trying to influence the 
report.
	Temporal matches between auditor changes and changes in the opinion 
(tmatch).
	Average length of auditors' contracts (lengt).
	Ratio between qualified audit reports and total number of reports (pqual). 
	Number of critical qualified audit reports (pcqual). In this case, critical 
refers to i) uncertainties relevant to the company’s survival; and ii) non-
5In Spain, mandatory audit is defined in terms of number of employees, assets, and turnover. Larger companies 
are usually required to be audited, while SMEs’ meet these conditions only irregularly.A parsimonious model to forecast financial distress, based on audit evidence
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compliances with the GAAP that are empirically related to business failure 
situations, e.g. irregular capitalisation of expenses.
	Auditor type (auty). The vulnerability of the auditor under pressure from 
the company is especially related to his high or low profile, as well as the 
degree of his economic dependence. Therefore, the interactions may be less 
frequent in the case of auditors who are members of the firm and even less 
frequent in the case of multinational accounting firms. This variable has 
been computed as categorical (individual, local/national society, big four)
	Explicit obstructionism (obstr): such as lack of collaboration by the company, 
and massive failure of mailing circularisation and balance confirmation.
	Non-compliance with the obligation of auditing the accounts (nonau).
	Delays  in  the  filing  of  annual  financial  statements  in  the  Commercial 
Registry (delfil).
Sample
Data was collected through a balanced sampling from non-financial audited com-
panies with no more than a hundred employees, and whose central offices were 
located in Galicia. These firms were required to be at least five years old, to avoid 
any confusion effect caused by the well-known anomalous morbidity rate in young 
businesses; besides that, given the nature of the independent variables of our work, 
we also excluded those companies with less than two audit reports available6. Sam-
pling was carried out according to the information supplied by the SABI (Ibe-
rian Balance-sheets Analysis System) and the Commercial Registry for the period 
1998-20087.
Preliminary statistical analysis showed extremely anomalous failure rates in buil-
ding industry and real estate activities; this bias was caused by external exceptio-
nally adverse conditions which were unrelated to the relationship we were mode-
lling, therefore those activities were also excluded. The final sample was made up 
of 98 companies.
6In the logit model, the number of available audit reports is controlled by the variable pyears.
7 We ruled out the year 2009 because at the time when the basic sampling was done, the accounting information 
for this year was not available in the general statistics from the SABI database. Therefore, using that year would 
mean to have to restrict the sample extremely, affecting both the healthy and bankrupt companies.
  Carlos Piñeiro Sánchez, Pablo de Llano Monelos y Manuel Rodríguez López
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Method
Given the dichotomous character of the dependent variable and the nature of the in-
dependent variables, our study is based on a logistic (logit) regression model. This 
allows us to estimate the probability of a company – with particular characteristics 
regarding the auditing process (number of reports, nature and proportion of quali-
fications, degree of compliance with the registry obligations, etc.) – being subject 
to financial dysfunctions driving the company to business failure. Logit models do 
not depend on restrictive assumptions with respect to the joint distribution of the 
probability of the independent variables; this is a notable strength because financial 
ratios and most of real empirical variables do not fit Gaussian distributions.
Let Yj be a binary variable expressing the financial health of the jth company (zero 
if j is empirically healthy, and one if j has filed for bankruptcy protection); let Xh 
be the independent variable hth. The logit model can be expressed as:
   
where  . The resulting p-value is the es-
timated probability of an observation j with profile Xj = {X1j, X2j … Xnj} ending in 
business failure.
Results and discussion
The model has been estimated following a stepwise procedure, in order to select 
the most significant subset of predictors. Three variables are significant in the final 
model:
	Non-compliance  with  deadlines  to  approve  and  file  annual  financial 
statements (delfil).  According  to  our  results,  this  is  the  more  relevant 
variable, given the associated odds-ratio (OR = 2.77E+09).
	The average length of the contracts (length): with a negative coefficient and 
an odds-ratio less than one; therefore, the longer the contract is, the lower 
the odds of the company suffering financial distress. Our results indicate that 
each additional year corresponds to a decrease of 27% in the likelihood.
	The  proportion  of  qualified  opinion  reports  (pqual);  the  odds-ratio  is A parsimonious model to forecast financial distress, based on audit evidence
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statistically different from one, given the results of the Wald test and 
the extreme values of the confidence interval for the odds-ratio, thus we 
can reliably assume that this variable helps evaluate the relative risk of a 
company receiving additional modified reports. Our results indicate that 
each of these modified opinions increase the risk to 3%.
All these coefficients are statistically significant for α = 0.01 and their signs are 
coherent with previous research and with financial theory. The average length of 
the contracts is negatively related to the estimated failure odds. Therefore, these 
events are ceteris paribus, less frequent among companies that have long contracts 
or, in their absence, whose policy is to renew them regularly. On the contrary, the 
estimators corresponding to the proportion of modified opinion reports and non-
compliance with deadlines to pass and file annual financial statements are positive. 
Accordingly, the accumulation of qualified opinion reports and/or reiterative brea-
ches of the registry obligations appear to be clear warning signals. 
Figure 1
Descriptive statistics (independent variables)
Altogether the final model turns out to be significant (figure 2 and figure 3). The 
-2LL statistic is relatively small and the generalised coefficients of determination, 
particularly Nagelkerke’s R2, have satisfactory values for an empirical exploratory 
study like this – as it is well-known, Cox’s and Snell’s R2 is not strictly bounded 
to be between zero and one. The same conclusion can be deduced from Hosmer’s 
and Lemeshow’s statistic and the specificity and sensitivity levels, as well as from 
the total percentage of success in the classification (figure 4).
Healthy Distressed Healthy Distressed
Average SD Average SD Average SD Average SD
pyears 0.57 0.04 0.38 0.04 delfil 1.13 0.09 1.10 0.10
length 3.76 0.54 2.83 0.27 tmatch 0.10 0.10 0.63 0.13
Pqual 17.88 9.87 56.94 8.08 propcam 0.26 0.09 0.33 0.06
pqualg 3.65 2.50 16.79 4.46 naudit 1.41 0.12 1.59 0.13
Obstru 1.10 0.10 1.13 0.09 auty 2.20 0.11 1.86 0.09
nonau 1.20 0.13 1.38 0.13Carlos Piñeiro Sánchez, Pablo de Llano Monelos y Manuel Rodríguez López
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Figure 2
 Model’s coefficients
Figure 3
Model statistics
Figure 4
Table of classification
Figure 5
Correlations matrix
Let us look into our results in more detail. Our findings support the view of the rela-
tionships between the company and the auditor as being governed by informational 
asymmetries; this context is suitable to implement opportunistic strategies aimed 
at biasing the collection and interpretation of audit evidence, and the opinion- ma-
Model’s 
coefficients
B E.T. Wald gl Sig. Odds-ratio
I.C. 95.0% for 
OR
length -0.32 0.14 4.96 1 0.03 0.73 0.55 0.96
pqual 0.03 0.01 14.39 1 0.00 1.03 1.01 1.04
delfil 21.74 8642.69 0.00 1 1.00 2.77E+09 0.00 .
Constant -22.16 8642.69 0.00 1 1.00 0.00
Hosmer and Lemeshow test Models Summary
Step Chi-square gl Step
-2 log of 
likelihood
Cox’s and 
Snell’s R2
Nagelkerke’s 
R2 Sig.
3 6.1104 8 3 74.8949 0.4632 0.6176 0.6349
Observation  
Forecast Correct
Percentage Healthy Distressed
Observed
Healthy 42 7 85.71
Distressed 13 36 73.47
Global percentage (cut-off value = 0.5) 79.59
Constant pqual delfil Length
Constant 1.000 .000 -1.000 .000
Length .000 .102 .000 1.000
Pqual .000 1.000 .000 .102
Delfil -1.000 .000 1.000 .000A parsimonious model to forecast financial distress, based on audit evidence
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king process. First, the duration of the contracts – which is a measure inverse to 
the auditor turnover rate – is linked to the company’s financial health. Healthy 
companies are prone to rely on the same auditor to make the reports during longer 
periods of time, as well as hire the services of national and international accoun-
ting firms. On the contrary, the retrospective analysis on the conduct of companies 
under financial distress reveals that their auditing process is more irregular in sub-
jective (responsible auditor) and objective (number of audit reports, sense of the 
report, number of qualifications and severity of the uncertainties pointed out by the 
auditor) terms. These results extend previous evidence reported by Carcello et al. 
(2003): who found that auditors who had served their clients for more than three 
years were more likely to issue a going-concern opinion, all other things being 
equal; while some priceless works suggest that audit effectiveness might decrease 
after the first year of the contract (Beck et al., 1988): our results indicate that long-
term contracts do not seem to undermine auditors’ independence.
Available evidence indicate that distressed firms change auditors more frequently 
than others (Schwartz and Menon, 1985; Schwartz and Soo, 1995; Ruiz and Gó-
mez, 2001; Chen et al., 2009); this corroborates previous results (e.g. Simunic, 
1984 and Robinson, 2008) that warn the existence of scenarios where the auditor’s 
independence is threatened by power and/or economic dependence asymmetries 
that may leave him in a vulnerable position. We think it is realistic to say that dis-
tressed firms try to prevent the auditor from revealing their financial imbalances 
–through qualifications and/or uncertainties– with the help of their hiring policy. 
It is interesting to point out that the variables “proportion of qualified audit re-
ports” and “average length of the contracts” have a small empiric correlation but 
are positive (ρ = 0.102) and therefore we suggest a detailed study to check if the   
accumulation of qualifications is actually less prominent in companies with a hi-
gher auditor turnover rate. Unlike previous works, we have not found any evidence 
regarding the relationship between auditor quality, auditor vulnerability, and the 
client’s financial stability. Finally, none of the situations grouped in the variable 
obstr has led to a disclaimer of opinion; we must conclude that the auditors did not 
perceive any sign of lack of cooperation from the firms.
On the contrary, the odds-ratio associated with the variable pqual appears to be 
abnormally low. There is a lot of empirical evidence concerning the relationship 
between financial distress, accruals, and the issuing of qualified opinions, therefore 
our result might demand a more detailed analysis. Until 2010 the Spanish Audit 
Law did not make an explicit distinction between GAAP non-fulfilments and un-Carlos Piñeiro Sánchez, Pablo de Llano Monelos y Manuel Rodríguez López
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certainties, therefore our variable pqual combines multiple circumstances that may 
have little relation to underlying financial distress scenarios. Modified reports are 
much more frequent in Spain than in the US because Spanish law allows issuing 
qualified opinions not only when the firm faces relevant uncertainties, but also 
when a GAAP non-fulfilment is detected, and even when the auditor decides to 
convey some information that he or she believes relevant. For example, Spanish 
auditors usually include a formal qualification the first time they audit a firm, sta-
ting that they did not attend the stock control; this implies a qualified report but, 
obviously, is not supposed to be connected with a higher financial risk. It is likely 
that many of the recorded qualifications are irrelevant from the standpoint of fi-
nancial diagnosis; this might have biased the estimation of the odds-ratio for this 
variable.
It is important to emphasize that external users should not pay attention to how se-
rious the qualifications seem to be, but to the general attitude of the company as re-
flected by all the available audit reports: according to our model, the accumulation 
of qualifications, even if they seem to be irrelevant, is indicative of the existence 
of underlying financial imbalances that may lead the firm to bankruptcy. This does 
not mean that critical qualifications and going-concern uncertainties are irrelevant, 
but that they can be caused by transitory circumstances –such as an uncertainty– 
that the company may overcome subsequently. On the contrary, recurrent qualifi-
cations are indicative of a chronic, unsolved distress.
According to our opinion, it is really important for the financial practice to deter-
mine the technical criteria for the issue of qualified opinions and the assessment 
on how important they are. Auditing Standards have pushed the uncertainties into 
a simple emphasis paragraph and, in our opinion, this may be confusing to some 
extent. At least in Spain, external users usually interpret a clean report as a sign of 
normality and well-doing in the company, because the qualifications and uncer-
tainties are related to underlying financial imbalances and risks (Hopwood et al., 
1989). The loss of information can be especially intense for those investors using 
web syndication services, or AI-based semantic tools; in these cases the uncertain-
ties could be underestimated or even go unnoticed if the information of the Annual 
Report is not comprehensive enough, or does not highlight the key procedures, or 
underestimates the adverse scenarios. 
We haven’t found any evidence for the so-called self-fulfilling prophecy –the as-
sumption that the failure is caused by the auditor’s opinion–. Because of the finan-A parsimonious model to forecast financial distress, based on audit evidence
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cial logic, this hypothesis (in fact a post hoc, ergo propter hoc inference) leads to 
an untenable sophism. It is possible that an imprudent or ill-considered opinion 
may aggravate the financial imbalance, however we cannot forget that the failure 
has been caused by real financial dysfunctions preceding the audit report and the-
refore, not caused by the latter. The auditor fulfils his or her duty to the company 
and to society when he or she reveals the uncertainties that may plausibly affect the 
business continuity; the general omission of these references could cause a moral 
risk incompatible with the trust governing the trade activity.
Conclusions
Our study provides a forecast model designed to infer the latent financial imba-
lances in small and medium enterprises that are not traded on a secondary market; 
independent variables are quantitative and qualitative measures directly derived 
from the external audit process, and audit reports themselves. The analysis of audit 
reports confirms that financially imbalanced firms tend to change auditors more 
frequently than others (Schwartz and Menon, 1985; Schwartz and Soo, 1995; Ruiz 
and Gómez, 2001); auditors are hired for shorter periods of time, and this beha-
viour can be interpreted as an attempt to lessen the levels of thoroughness and 
independence. However, empirical evidence suggests that these attempts are fruit-
less: distressed firms receive more qualified opinion reports, and their auditors re-
veal more going-concern uncertainties. It is noticeable that the average proportion 
of qualified reports reduces in line with the duration of the contracts: this finding 
is in line with previous results discussed in literature, but it can also be interpreted 
as a sign of collusion between auditors and their clients.
Given these results, it is not surprising that distressed companies have a tendency 
to disregard the deadlines for registration of the CCAA and the audit report, and 
even to breach the mandatory external audit. This attitude must be interpreted as an 
extreme attempt to prevent financial imbalance and/or discretional accruals being 
disclosed, and therefore corroborates auditor’s independence.
The logit model achieves a hit rate of over 80% using a small number of external 
objective indicators; therefore, it strictly complies with the principle of simpli-
city or parsimony. The most valuable external signs of financial distress are i) 
non-compliance with deadlines to file the annual financial statements; ii) repeated 
changes in auditors (short-term contracts, and high rotation rate); and iii) accumu-
lation of qualified opinion reports over time. Carlos Piñeiro Sánchez, Pablo de Llano Monelos y Manuel Rodríguez López
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We believe that improving the codification of the qualifications can enhance the 
accuracy of the model; as we have discussed, most of the qualifications registered 
by Spanish auditors are not directly connected with financial distress. A promising 
approach is to develop a semantic classification rule, which is able to diagnose and 
label each qualification, according to its effect on financial stability (Butler et al, 
2004). Model must also be enhanced to support the estimation of intertemporal 
odds: a specification of the time structure of financial distress risk might be useful 
to assess the severity of the imbalances, and to estimate the remaining time before 
they become irreversible.
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